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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF· UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Jb~S~ 
-vs- Case No. ~ 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant appeals from his conviction by the 
Court, sitting without a jury, of two counts of Forcible 
Sexual Abuse in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1953), 
as amended. The charge was based on appellant's causing 
others to take indecent liberties with appellant's wife. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried on November 27, 1979 in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court for Juab County. The trial 
was conducted before the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge, 
sitting without a jury. Judge Sorenson found appellant guilty 
as charged of two counts of Forcible Sexual Abuse, in violation 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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of § 76-5-404, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, a 
third degree felony. 
On January 4, 1980, Judge Sorenson sentenced 
appellant to two indeterminate terms not to exceed five (5) 
years in the Utah State Prison. The sentences were to run 
concurrently. (R. at 42-43). 
RELIEF SOUGH1r ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks aff irmance of the judgment and 
sentence pronounced by the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 4, 1979 the appellant brought a hitchhikei 
named "B.J." to his home in the town of Nephi, Juab County, 
Utah (T. 6) . The appellant asked B. J. to help appellant instaJ 
an engine in the latter's truck in exchange for which B.J. 
could have intercourse with Toni Kennedy, appellant's wife (T. 
When confronted with this proposition, Mrs. Kennedy told 
appellant she did not want to have intercourse with B.J. to 
which appellant replied that that was the only way he could 
get his truck fixed (T.7). 
After B.J. and appellant finished work, B.J. took 
a shower, and Mrs. Kennedy again told appellant she didn't 
want to have intercourse with B.J. Appellant then set up a 
tape recorder and went into a bedroom closet while B.J. and 
Mrs. Kennedy had intercourse (T. 8-9). Appellant had earli~ 
-2-
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instructed B.J. to teach Mrs. Kennedy "different positions" 
in which to have sex (T. 9). Mrs. Kennedy tried to leave the 
house bu~ appellant caught her and brought her back. B.J. 
had intercourse with her again, while appellant watched, then 
appellant had intercourse with her (T. 9). 
B.J. stayed with the Kennedy's for three or four 
nights and was allowed to have sexual intercourse with Mrs. 
Kennedy on all but the last night (T. 12). Each day, Mrs. 
Kennedy told her husband she did not want to have intercourse 
with B.J., but appellant forced her to continue until his 
truck was fixed (T. 12, 13). 
On August 22, 1979, a man named "Rick" appeared at 
the Kennedys home. "Rick" had been there before in March of 
1979 (T. 14). Appellant took Rick to a fast-food restaurant 
a few blocks ·away, was gone about forty-five minutes, and when 
he returned told Mrs. Kennedy that he wanted her to "go to bed" 
with Rick to avoid trouble (T. 15-16). 
Later that evening, Rick had sexual intercourse with 
Mrs. Kennedy. Appellant had again turned the tape recorder on 
to record the event and was hiding in the closet (T. 17). He 
listened to the tapes in his shop "over and over again" (T. 28). 
Appellant had Mrs. Kennedy return to bed and both Rick and 
appellant had sexual intercourse with her (T. 17). Rick stayed 
the next night also and had intercourse with Mrs. Kennedy 
again (T. 17). 
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Mrs. Kennedy testified that this type of event had 
occurred five or six times (T. 19). Appellant told Mrs. 
Kennedy that he wanted her to go to bed with the men he 
brought home and threatened that if she tried to leave, he 
would not let her take their baby. He further threatened to 
kill her father if he intervened (T. 19). Appellant was in. 
possession of_ several pictures depicting Mrs. Kennedy in the 
act of sexual intercourse with another man which he threatened 
to disclose to her father if she did not cooperate (T. 19). 
Further, appellant used physical violence or threatened to 
use violence against Mrs. Kennedy (T. 20). She testified that 
I 
but for appellant's coercion she would not have had intercourse, 
with these men (T. 24). 
The State introduced the testimony of Sheri Lynn 
Blackburn, Mrs. Kennedy's eighteen-year-old sister who reco~~ 
that on August 22, 1979 she was taken into the Kennedy's bedroo 
by their daughter, Dawn, and was introduced to "Rick" who was 
under the "covers" with Mrs. Kennedy (T. 42). Ms. Blackburn 
overheard appellant and Mrs. Kennedy arguing and heard appell~ 
tell Mrs. Kennedy that she would do anything he told her to {T. 
Upon taking the stand, appellant testifi~d that the~ 
acts were done with his wife's consent (T. 48). He admitted 
using the tape recorder to "find out what was going on in the 
room at the time" (T. 47). He also admitted sitting in the 
-4-
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closet while B.J. and Mrs. Kennedy had sexual intercourse 
and later having intercourse with her while B.J. watched 
(T. 60)., Finally, appellant admitted using physical violence 
against Mrs. Kennedy during their arguments (T. 56). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404 (1953), AS 
AMENDED, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE PER SE OR AS APPLIED TO THIS 
CASE. 
Appellant was charged and convicted under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1953), as amended, which 
provides: 
(1) A person commits forcible 
sexual abuse if, under circumstances 
not amounting to rape or sodomy, the 
actor touches the anus or any part of 
the genitals of another, or otherwise 
takes indecent liberties with another, 
or causes another to take indecent 
liberties with the actor or another, 
with the intent to cause substantial 
emotional or bodily pain to any person 
or with intent to arouse or gratify 
the sexual desire of any person, without 
the consent of the other, regardless of 
the sex of either participant. 
Appellant was convicted of having caused another to take 
indecent liberties with his wife, without her consent, and 
with the intent to gratify or arouse his own sexual desire. 
Appellant contends on appeal that the phrase "indecent 
liberties" is so unclear as to render the statute 
unconstitutionally vague. The fact that this statute 
does not specifically delineate the types of conduct which 
constitute "indecent. liberties" does not render it 
-6-
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unconstitutionally vague. Under current standards, a law 
is not unconstitutionally vague unless it fails to give 
a person.of ordinary intelligence reasonable opportunity 
to know what the statute proscribes. Smith v. Goguen, 415 
U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 
(1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 
(1972). 
The courts have recognized that where commonsense 
understanding reveals the general nature of the conduct 
prohibited, the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not mandate complete certainty about the 
meaning of statutory terms. Thus, in a recent case, the 
Colorado Supreme Court held that: 
Where fairness can be achieved by 
a commonsense reading of the statute, 
we will not adopt a hypertechnical 
construction to invalidate the provision. 
People v. Garcia, Colo., 595 P.2d 228, 231 (1979). See also 
State v. Randol, Kan., 597 P.2d 672 (1979). In Boyce Motor 
Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952), the Supreme Court 
of the United States wrote: 
But few words possess the precision 
of mathematical symbols, most statutes 
must deal with untold and unforeseen 
variations in factual situations, and the 
practical necessities of government 
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inevitably limit the specificity with 
which legislators can spell out prohibi-
tions. Consequently, no more than a 
reasonable degree of certainty can be 
demanded. Nor is it unfair to require 
that one who deliberately goes perilously 
close to an area of proscribed conduct 
shall take the risk that he may cross 
the line. 
342 u. s. 33 7' 340. 
This Court has also recognized the principle 
in State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952), 
cited by appellant. The Court there stated: 
The limitations of language are 
such that neither absolute exactitude 
nor complete precis~on of meaning are 
to be expected, and such standard 
cannot be required. 
250 P.2d 561, 564. Respondent submits that the phrase 
"indecent liberties" is sufficiently precise to give a 
person of ordinary intelligence notice that the type of 
conduct in which appellant engaged is prohibited. 
In the case of State v. MacMillan, 46 Utah 19, 
145 Pac. 833 (1915), this Court recognized that the term 
"indecent liberties" is self-defining and capable of being 
understood by anyone familiar with the English language. 
Recently, this Court reconsidered MacMillan in the ·context 
of a charge of Forcible Sexual Abuse in State of Utah in 
the Interest of J.L.S., No. 16253, decided April 11, 1980. 
In that case a minor was charged with taking "indecent 
-8-
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liberties" in that he touched the clothed breasts of the 
victim. In reversing the conviction, this Court 
reconf inrted the MacMillan decision but added an inter-
pretation of the tenn "indecent liberties" to avoid 
vagueness: 
In the present statute 76-5-404(1), 
the term "indecent liberties" cannot 
derive the requisite specificity of 
meaning required constitutionally, by 
being read in conjunction with the age 
of the victim, but if it be considered 
as ref erring to conduct of the same 
magnitude of gravity as that specifically 
described in the statute, the potential 
infirmity for vagueness is rectified. 
State in the Interest of J.L.S., supra, at pp. 3-4 (emphasis 
added). 
When the statute is read in terms of this "magnitude 
of gravity" test and in the light of commonsense and understand-
ing, as applied to the facts of this case it is not unconsti-
tutionally vague. Causing another person to have sexual 
intercourse with one's wife without her consent is of equal 
or greater gravity as touching the anus or genitals of another 
or of causing another to do so. Indeed, the acts of 
intercourse engaged in in this case involved unconsented to 
"touching" of Mrs. Kennedy's genitals. Although the conduct 
here does not amount to rape, it falls somewhere between rape 
and mere touching of another's anus or genitals. 
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Further, common usage of the term "indecent 
liberties" includes taking indecent liberties with 'the 
wife of another person. This includes the act of sexual 
intercourse. Thus, when the appellant caused others to 
have sexual intercourse with the appellant's wife without 
her consent, he was causing them to take "indecent liberties'' 
with her and commonsense would indicate that such conduct 
is proscribed by the statute. As in Boyce Motor Lines, 
quoted supra, appellant by engaging in conduct which is 
"perilously close" to proscribed conduct assumed the risk 
of crossing the line. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
Appellant contends the evidence adduced at 
trial is insufficient to support the conviction. Specifically, 
he alleges that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable I 
doubt: 
1) that appellant caused others to 
take indecent liberties with his wife; 
2) that such was without his wife's 
consent, and; 
3) that such acts were for the purpose 
of arousing or gratifying the appellant's 
sexual desires. 
Respondent submits that substantial evidence of each of these 
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elements was presented at trial. 
It is well established in Utah that in order for 
a convic~ed defendant to succeed in challenging on appeal 
the sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial, he must 
establish that the evidence was so inconclusive or insub-
stantial that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable 
doubt that the defendant commited the crime. State v. Daniels, 
584 P.2d 880 {Utah 1978); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 {Utah 
1977}; State v. Jones, 554 P.2d 1321 {Utah 1976). Such 
cases also establish that in considering a claim of insufficency 
of the evidence on appeal, this Court must assume that the 
trier of fact believed those aspects of the evidence and drew 
such reasonable inferences therefrom ~s support the verdict. 
Where, as in the case at bar, the evidence is conflicting: 
. . . we are obliged to assume on 
appeal that the jury believed those 
aspects of the evidence which support 
the verdict; and that, in doing so, 
there is ~ reasonable basis therein 
upon which the jury could believe 
that the defendant committed that 
offense as charged. 
State v. Gandee, 587 P.2d 1064, 1065-1066 (Utah 1978); see 
also State in the Interest of M.S., 584 P.2d 914 (Utah 1978), 
establishing that the same principle applies to bench trials. 
The appellant has failed to meet this showing, 
having only pointed to the conflict in testimony at the trial, 
and assuming that the only evidence presented was appellant's 
-11-
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testimony. The testimony presented by the State shows 
appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
First, Mrs. Kennedy established that appellant 
made deals with both B.J. and Rick culminating in his 
giving them access to his wife (T. 7, 16). This establishes 
that the appellant caused these men to take indecent liberties 
with Mrs. Ken_nedy and this testimony was believed by the 
trial judge. Second, Mrs. Kennedy testified that each time 
she had intercourse with the other men, appellant set up 
a tape-recorder next to the bed and was watching from the 
bedroom closet (T. 8, 17). Further, appellant sat on the bed 
and watched while both B.J. and Rick have intercourse with 
Mrs. Kennedy (T. 10, 17). Appellant told B.J. to teach 
Mrs. Kennedy different "positions" (T. 9). Finally, Mrs. 
Kennedy established that appellant listened to the tape 
recordings in his shop "over and over again" ( T. 2 8) . This 
evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that a~pellant 
caused these men to have intercourse with his wife to arouse 
or gratify his ~exual desire. 
Third, appellant relies on the contention that 
these acts were engaged in with Mrs. Kennedy's consen±. 
Section 76-5-406, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, provides: 
An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, 
or sexual abuse is without the consent of 
the victim under any of the following 
circumstances: 
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(1) When the actor compels 
the victim to submit or par-
ticipate by force that over-
comes such earnest resistance 
as might reasonably be expected 
under the circumstances; or 
(2) The actor compels the 
victim to submit or participate 
by any threat that would prevent 
resistance by a person of ordinary 
resolution . . . 
(emphasis added). Appellant contends that the degree of 
resistance necessary to vitiate consent in the case at bar 
is the same as that required in rape cases. Respondent 
rejects this contention. 
On the facts of the instant case, the "actor" is 
not the person committing the act of sexual intercourse, 
but rather the person who caused such other persons to 
take indecent liberties with Mrs. Kennedy: the appellant. 
Thus, in testing the degree of consent by Mrs. Kennedy, the 
relevant inquiry focuses on the degree of coercion or threats 
which appellant employed to force her to have intercourse 
with these men. 
Because of the husband-wife relationship between 
the appellant and Mrs. Kennedy, the degree of coercion 
necessary to overcome her reasonable resistance in this 
case is lower than in other circumstances. Appellant 
exercised inherent authority over his wife. Her alternatives 
of leaving appellant completely or of going to the police 
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were unreasonable in the circumstances, due to appellant's 
threats, detailed below. Mrs. Kennedy could not legally 
force appellant to leave his own home. Mrs. Kennedy reit-
erated several times at trial that the acts of intercourse 
with B.J. and Rick were without her consent (T. 7, 12, 13, 
16, 18, 24, 33). She pleaded with appellant not to force 
her to have intercourse with these men, but appellant refused 
to listen. In the five or six times that this conduct 
occurred, appellant threatened that if Mrs. Kennedy did not 
have intercourse with the men, he would kill her father, would 
blackmail her with pictures of she and another man together, 
would use these activities to obtain custody of their 
children if she tried to leave him, and would "come after her" 
if she tried to leave (T. 19). Appellant used physical force 
against her, and when she tried to get away to avoid having 
intercourse with B.J., appellant caught her and forced her 
to return to their home (T. 9, 20). When asked on cross-
examination why she had not reported these acts to the police, 
Mrs. Kennedy stated that she was afraid of what might happen 
(T. 31). 
The psychological effect of these threats o~ Mrs. 
Kennedy is established by the fact that she unsuccessfully 
attempted suicide by taking an overdose of pills (T. 22,23). 
She felt as though the whole world was against her (T. 23). 
-14-
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In light of this evidence, Mrs. Kennedy, as a person of 
ordinary resolution, could not be expected to have done 
more to xesist having intercourse with the other men. If 
she tried to leave she would either be caught or risk losing 
her children. If she tried to physically resist the advances 
of the other men, she faced possible forcible compulsion by 
either the appellant or the other men, or both. There is 
sufficient evidence here to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that these acts were committed without the consent 
of Mrs. Kennedy. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that appellant's conviction 
and sentence should be affirmed, since the State produced 
sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court's finding of 
guilt, and the statute under which appellant was charged is 
not unconstitutionally vague. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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